



# *The President's Daily Brief*

~~Top Secret~~ 9 January 1968



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DAILY BRIEF  
9 JANUARY 1968

1. Vietnam

There are major enemy build-ups in three areas. Perhaps the most immediate and serious threat is just below the Demilitarized Zone, where elements of four North Vietnamese divisions are concentrating around the allied base at Khe Sanh. This subject is discussed at Annex today.

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2.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

NR

\* \* \*

[Redacted]

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
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
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# COMMUNIST BUILD-UP AREAS



**SOUTH VIETNAM**

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## ANNEX

North Vietnamese Build-up Below the  
Demilitarized Zone

In the past several weeks there have been a number of indications that the enemy is building up in three separate areas in or near South Vietnam. Major enemy offensive activity in these areas could come at any time.

The most significant threat is posed in northern I Corps. [REDACTED]

3.3(h)(2)

[REDACTED] North Vietnamese infantry divisions are presently located in the Laos panhandle adjacent to the western edge of the Demilitarized Zone and South Vietnam's Quang Tri Province. These units are the 304th and 325 "C" Divisions and possibly the 320th Division. As many as six regiments of these divisions are presently in this area. In addition, at least one regiment of the 324 "B" Division is located in western Quang Tri Province.

The target primarily threatened by these forces appears to be the allied base at Khe Sanh in western Quang Tri. Enemy reconnaissance and probing activity near Khe Sanh has increased markedly in the last few weeks. [REDACTED]

3.3(h)(2)

[REDACTED] The Communists could be using the time between now and the Tet holidays to complete their concentration around Khe Sanh in preparation for an offensive after Tet.

This grouping of forces in Laos and western Quang Tri Province also strengthens North Vietnamese defenses of the Laos corridor. There have been indications of Hanoi's concern over the possible extension of the US electronic "barrier" and strong-point system into Laos.

The second major enemy build-up is under way in southern I Corps. [REDACTED]

3.3(h)(2)

[REDACTED] Most recently, the 31st Regiment of the 341st North Vietnamese Division was noted moving into this area from the A Shau Valley.

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The third enemy threat is developing in South Vietnam's Binh Long, Phuoc Long, and Quang Duc Provinces--also known as Viet Cong Military Region 10. Since late November, three possible North Vietnamese infantry battalions as well as other forces have been noted moving into this area from the western highlands. These units will probably join elements of three enemy divisions currently spread throughout the region. There have been signs for some time that the Communists intend to make this area a major battleground in the coming months.

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*FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY*

## Special Daily Report on North Vietnam



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9 January 1968

Special Daily Report on North Vietnam  
for the President's Eyes Only

9 January 1968

I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION

Hanoi on Negotiations: We have no additional North Vietnamese commentary on the subject of negotiations.

A Japanese news agency is carrying the replies of North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Trinh to a questionnaire submitted by two Japanese correspondents. Trinh disparaged the President's San Antonio speech as a "deceitful attempt" to mask new escalation of the war. Trinh cited his statement of a year ago that a bombing halt is the precondition for any US - North Vietnamese talks. The interview adds nothing to Hanoi's position on this issue and the questionnaire probably was submitted to Trinh before his recent and authoritative remarks on this subject on 30 December.

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3.3(h)(2)

Report of Ho's Death Premature: Hanoi's sensitivity to rumors of Ho Chi Minh's health

3.3(h)(2)

the regime has gone out of its way recently to have Ho meet with foreign delegations and to demonstrate that he is relatively fit at present.

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3.3(h)(2)

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Minority Problems:

minority peoples of North Vietnam remain a continuing problem for the regime. These people are only an irritant, however, and certainly not a serious element of instability.

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II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL ATTITUDES ON THE WAR

There is nothing of significance to report.

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